rise will remain peaceful or become confrontational. To understand Chinese grand strategy, this paper draws on its long history and classical thinkers to offer four main arguments. First, China is highly sensitive to its periphery (that is expanding), where it demands preeminence. Second, the measure of internal stability within China has major bearing on its strategic conduct. Third, traditional Chinese caution for strategic overreach is changing, as it projects interests in distant continents, albeit, with greater emphasis on diplomacy and trade. Fourth, reclaiming the status of a great power by rectifying the failings of initial encounters with the West is a dominant motive, in China's changing strategic calculus from national interest to international influence. In keeping with the growing influence, the Chinese leadership has proposed an alternative paradigm for international order called 'harmonious world', based on the Confucian principle of guanxi of multiple layers of relationships. Past conduct however portends fault-lines in harmony in the periphery, where cracks in China's internal security overlap with competing spheres of influence, raising the specter of confrontation involving potential allies of the United States.
CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY: FROM CONFUCIUS TO CONTEMPORARY
According to the United States National Intelligence Council's Project: Global Trends 2025: "China will have the world's second largest economy and will be a leading military power" by 2025. China's rapid growth and increasing influence has begun to affect international order as it presents a different paradigm of politics and development.
The impact of this change is affecting China's periphery, the world and the United States in particular. National interests of China include, defending sovereignty and territorial integrity, maintaining domestic political stability, sustaining economic growth and development, perpetuating Chinese Communist Party rule and above all, securing China's status as a great power. There is much current debate and study based on theories of international relations, power transition, and economic power politics, on whether China's rise will remain peaceful or become confrontational.
To understand China's grand strategy this paper looks at its long history, classical thinkers, and conduct from the ancient dynasties to the present. While recognizing existing scholarship, the paper draws on China's past international behavior to offer four main arguments. First, China is highly sensitive to its periphery (that is expanding), in which it demands preeminence, shows willingness to use force, and proclivity for risk. Second, the measure of internal stability within China has a major bearing on its strategic conduct. Third, traditionally China has been cautious of strategic overreach and not demonstrated an expeditionary tendency. In recent times however, Chinese caution is changing as it projects interests in distant continents, albeit with greater emphasis on diplomacy and trade. Fourth, reclaiming the lost status of a great power by rectifying failings of the initial encounter with the West is a dominant motive in China's transitioning from national interest to international influence in strategic conduct.
To support the arguments, the paper starts with a brief chronology of Chinese history with the first section looking at clues from classical thinkers of the ancient dynasties.
The second, third and fourth sections survey the literature on statecraft in the imperial era, republican period and the Mao era respectively. The fifth section reviews the period of reform and opening, and the final section considers the possible employment of instruments of power in the future.
Brief Chronology of Chinese History
China was unified for the first time in 221 BC, when the Qin state accomplished the subjugation of the six warring states and the King assumed the title Shi Huangdi (First Emperor). With the unification as the point of reference, China's history divides into the following parts:
• Pre 221 BC: Ancient dynasties.
• 221 BC to 1911 AD: Imperial Era.
• 1912 to 1949: Republic of China.
• Mao started with a security strategy replicating the imperial era mix of diplomatic maneuver with strong neighbors and coercion against weak neighbors. The lessons that emerged indicated the changed strategic realities, from an isolated past to a more active involvement of great powers in the region. In early 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) proclaimed its policy, of "leaning to one side" to gain Stalin's support. 22 This was a hedge against aggression by Japan or its allies. The oft-cited guidance from Deng Xiaoping perhaps best expresses the grand strategy adopted in the initial years of the reform: "observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership". In essence, it meant pursuing a plan for In a recent assessment of China's growing financial influence in great power politics, Daniel W. Derzen concludes; "China's reserves endow it with greater policy autonomy" and "tight coupling and complex interdependence between the US and which clearly show the quest for controlling global commons and power projection.
China will cause the incentive structures in global finance to more closely resemble the logic of nuclear deterrence". Although the prognosis may appear to reinforce the idea of trade being conducive to peace, but this obviously does not accurately convey the range and complexities of interdependence, and mutual expectations amongst the two powers. While discarding exaggerated concerns about the immediate future, for the medium term, Derzen forecasts a "peaceful but nervous coexistence". For the long term, his concern is, escalating US budget deficits may alter the equation from "mutual dependence to asymmetric dependence". 35 Going by the past, Chinese approach in the near future should be conservative, exploiting economic power for further consolidating influence in the region and over other distant trading partners for gaining greater leverage vis-à-vis United States in multilateral organizations.
Brock F. Tessman, based on an empirical analysis of GDP and Comprehensive
National Power shows that the PRC is currently in the early phase of relative power growth. Drawing on the logic of power cycle theory, he argues that, " the shift to the late stage of growth will be abrupt, significant and likely to generate increasing anxiety within the PRC about its windows of opportunity for achieving foreign policy objectives that it associates with great power status". If there is a large deficit between 'the power and role' or 'problems associated with inadequate status' in the international system, "we can expect the changing strategic incentives of late growth to be even more fertile ground for an aggressive, risky, and confrontational foreign policy agenda". 36 Going by China's extended neighborhood". 37 With unresolved border disputes and "separatist trends in Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang", the threat to China's internal security and international great power status merge in the periphery. Ultimately, any outside meddling with the periphery is unacceptable threat to national security and a strengthening China will not hesitate to flex its military strength here to teach lessons and demonstrate preeminence as it has done in the past.
Conclusion
China has been consistent in its strategy of proximity assertiveness. Consistent also is the penchant for coercion to exploit weakness and calculated maneuvering to engage strength. China's international conduct also manifests proclivity for risk and Endnotes
